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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In The Punisher’s Brain, Judge Morris Hoffman explores the foundations and 
development of our punishment practices through the lens of evolution.  Drawing 
on his experiences as both a trial judge and research fellow, Hoffman combines a 
wide-ranging evolutionary, historical, and scientific analysis of punishment with 
colorful examples drawn from law and life.  The result is an accessible and 
engaging account of punishment that raises a number of provocative possibilities 
for understanding, and potentially reforming, the institution of punishment. 
I confess to have opened the book with some trepidation.  It has become 
fashionable (again) in recent years for scholars to import wholesale the methods 
and mindset of the natural and social sciences into the study of punishment.  Too 
often, the result is a crude reductionism that neglects the social meaning and moral 
significance of this complex human institution.  Science can surely inform law, but 
it must never be permitted to occupy the field.  While Hoffman’s analysis 
occasionally succumbs to the imperial temptations of the genre, it is generally 
measured and modest in its claims and conclusions.  In this way, The Punisher’s 
Brain advances an important and fascinating debate without presuming to have 
settled—or conquered—it once and for all. 
 
II. COOPERATING, CHEATING, AND PUNISHING 
 
Hoffman begins by crediting punishment as essential to social cooperation 
and human flourishing.  Thus, “one key to civilization is our willingness to punish 
each other.”  (P. 1.)  From an evolutionary perspective, humans1 have (and always 
have had) significant incentives to cooperate with one another for mutual benefit.  
At the same time, we always face the temptation to cheat—to gain the advantages 
of group cooperation and effort without making the individual contributions and 
                                                                                                                                          
*   Associate Dean of Faculty and Professor of Law, Arizona State University Sandra Day 
O’Connor College of Law. 
1   Hoffman relies on various animal species, especially social animals, to illustrate the 
evolutionary phenomena he describes.  For convenience, I will generally refer only to human 
animals, noting here that many of the behaviors and dispositions obtain more broadly throughout the 
animal kingdom.  From the perspective of evolutionary biology, this suggests the general adaptability 
of these traits. 
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sacrifices that generate those advantages.  The tension between our cooperative 
and cheating natures—what Hoffman calls “The Social Problem”—requires a 
regulatory mechanism to manage these conflicting instincts.  In short: “Evolution 
built us to punish cheaters.”  (P. 1.) 
Hoffman enriches this evolutionary narrative with social science research that 
seeks to isolate and study human instincts to cooperate, to cheat, and to punish in 
the controlled setting of experimental games.  This research consistently suggests 
that humans (among others) will endeavor to work cooperatively—to share and 
grow the distribution of goods—but will punish perceived unfairness even at the 
expense of their own distributive shares.  These studies, backed by neuroscience 
research, also reveal the complex set of emotions engaged by even simple 
interactions involving relatively small stakes, with player conduct reflecting 
sensitive judgments about the motives and expectations of other players as well as 
one’s own feelings of trust and guilt.  In the evolutionary environment (and in the 
experimental setting), this complex set of behaviors and emotions points to “two 
core rules of right and wrong”—that transfers of property must be voluntary and 
that promises must be kept.2  The third rule is that serious violations against 
property and promise-keeping must be punished.  (P. 44.) 
Hoffman conceptualizes punishment in three forms.  The first line of defense 
against defection and cheating—“first-party punishment”—is the individual’s own 
conscience.  Thus, “[b]rains with built-in systems that make their owners feel bad 
when they cheat, and even when they contemplate cheating, are brains that will not 
cheat as often as brains without conscience.”  (P. 94.)  The painful feelings of guilt 
that occur after one has cheated serve as a further deterrent to future bad behavior.  
In this way, Hoffman contends, the emotions associated with conscience and 
guilt—and the capacity for empathy that underwrites them—serve as a kind of 
“short-cut to [a] utilitarian decision about whether to cooperate or cheat.”  (P. 95.)  
Indeed, the system is so effective that we rarely have occasion to consciously 
contemplate (or calculate) the costs and benefits of serious wrongdoing.3  An 
interesting discussion of psychopathy highlights the significance of these moral 
emotions and their potential relevance to anti-social behavior. 
Second-party punishment is reflected, paradigmatically, in acts of retaliation 
and revenge, but may also take the form of “a simple refusal to reciprocate.”  (P. 
128.)  In any of these forms, second-party punishment serves as a deterrent to 
would-be wrongdoers.  Thus, despite the cost to those who inflict it, retaliation 
                                                                                                                                          
2   MORRIS B. HOFFMAN, THE PUNISHER’S BRAIN: THE EVOLUTION OF JUDGE AND JURY 41 
(2014).  Property, in Hoffman’s broad conception, includes life and health, so the principle of 
voluntary transfer encompasses both criminal and tort law; the enforcement of promises is the 
domain of contract law. 
3   Hoffman also includes a discussion of neuroimaging research that maps the “neural 
correlates” of conscience and guilt.  Id. at 100.  These results suggest that conscience and guilt may 
take an abstract and a more contextual form, each engaging different circuits in the brain.  Id. at 101.  
Hoffman (among others) speculates that these distinctions may have implications for the institution of 
punishment and other forms of violence.  Id. at 130–06. 
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served indirectly to promote cooperation and trust.  This dynamic plays out in the 
experimental setting as well and is consistent with neuroscience and brain 
chemistry research in the context of trust and retaliation games.  Hoffman also 
suggests that the moral and legal bases for self-defense reflect a form of second-
party punishment, though this claim seems somewhat strained.  More convincing is 
the claim that the partial defense of provocation, which mitigates murder to 
manslaughter, reflects a recognition of the powerful, and to some degree 
reasonable, urge to retaliate. 
Hoffman posits that the transition from second to third-party punishment is 
associated with a variety of evolutionary forces and consequences.  In particular, 
the capacity for empathy allows us to identify with the victim of wrongdoing—to 
imaginatively experience a degree of the victim’s pain.  At the same time, because 
we do not actually suffer the victim’s pain, our retaliatory instincts are milder and 
more controlled and thus less destructive of social cooperation.  Moreover, because 
group well-being is bound up with individual well-being, a blow to a group 
member represents a potential threat to the group itself.  This willingness “to 
punish each other for generalized wrongs to each other” marks, for Hoffman, a 
crucial step in the march toward civilization.  (P. 152–53.)  It facilitated promise-
keeping and accountability, as well as greater security against various forms of 
interpersonal harm.  This, in turn, made it possible to expand the size of the group 
and delegate punishment to designated authorities. 
Hoffman notes that the instinct for third-party punishment is, in essence, 
retribution.4  Such third-party punishments ranged from banishment and death to 
calibrated fines and, eventually, the more familiar modern practice of 
imprisonment (itself a kind of banishment).  Because they could be graded 
according to culpability and harm, fines and prison terms allowed for a measure of 
proportionality, consistent with the principle of lex talionis.  Indeed, among the 
distinguishing features of retribution is the notion that the punishment should in 
some sense fit the crime.  Revenge, limitless in principle, risked over-punishment 
and “damaging cycles of violence.”  (P. 169.)  Finally, Hoffman considers various 
forms of legal excuse and justification, which are widely understood to shed light 
on the bases of responsibility.  Getting clear about the circumstances in which we 
are inclined to suspend judgments of liability—in the case of young children, for 
example—sharpens our focus on the proper grounds for punishment. 
Another basis for withholding punishment is one or another form of 
forgiveness.  Indeed, according to Hoffman, the term forgiveness applies to any 
situation in which the urge to blame and punish is instead restrained.  On this 
broad view, “[i]f blame is a rough proxy for optimizing deterrence, then 
forgiveness is its opposite—a rough proxy for when we should not punish because 
its costs outweigh its deterrent benefits.”  (P. 194.)  Hoffman maintains that 
forgiveness ranges from situations in which harm is so minimal that we simply 
                                                                                                                                          
4   He is careful here to note the “political baggage” the term has acquired and the sense in 
which it has become a pejorative, associated with punitive excess.  Id. at 158. 
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withhold blame, to the natural dissipation of feelings of blame once a wrongdoer 
has been punished, or when enough time has passed since the offense that we no 
longer feel the urge to retaliate.  Hoffman goes on to consider the ways in which 
such “forgiveness,” and the related concepts of apology and atonement, can help 
facilitate a wrongdoer’s reintegration into the group. 
The final chapters of the book focus on the legal implications of the 
evolutionary perspective, evaluating the ways in which our institutions of crime 
and punishment do—or should—reflect our essential nature.  Specifically, 
Hoffman highlights “dissonances”—instances where our legal rules appear to 
conflict with our evolved intuitions.  In the trial setting, this can result in jury 
nullification and, ultimately, undermine respect for the law in general.  But 
Hoffman argues that our intuitions should not always trump the positive law.  
Consider, for example, the evidentiary rule against informing jurors of a 
defendant’s prior criminal record.  From an evolutionary perspective, knowledge 
of another’s prior behavior would have been highly relevant in determining 
whether the person could be trusted or whether he posed an ongoing threat.  
Precisely because such information is so potentially powerful, however, we have 
made the policy judgment to exclude it from the modern criminal trial on the 
grounds that it is likely to be more prejudicial than probative of guilt. 
To address the problem of dissonance—to determine when to embrace our 
powerful instincts and when to restrain them—Hoffman develops a five-part 
framework.  The “dissonance test” is designed to gauge the evolutionary strength 
of both the intuition and the conflicting legal doctrine, the degree and direction of 
tension between them, and the integrity of the dissonant rule—that is, whether it 
includes significant exceptions that suggest it has been undermined by the pull of 
the intuition with which it conflicts.  Hoffman goes on to consider the legal 
processes designed to counter certain of our evolved instincts (to make snap 
judgments, for example), then to test various substantive doctrines using his five-
part framework. 
In the final chapter, Hoffman contends that evolution provides a fruitful 
vantage point from which to assess the institutions of blame and punishment, 
concluding that traditional punishment theorizing can neither explain nor usefully 
guide our practices.  Instead, Hoffman favors a version of retribution rooted in 
deterrence, for “retribution is deterrence, seen through the lens of natural 
selection.”  (P. 344.)  Whatever the practical results of this perspective—he 
predicts more custodial sentences of shorter duration—he is ultimately more 
focused on illumination than reform.  “A legal system that explicitly recognizes the 
evolved moral nature of blame, punishment, and forgiveness will be a better, more 
just, legal system, quite apart from whether those evolutionary insights result in 
any legal reforms at all.”  (P. 347.) 
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III. PHILOSOPHY, DISSONANCE, CANARDS & CLICHÉS 
 
Hoffman’s exploration of the evolutionary origins and implications of 
punishment is illuminating.  The evolutionary narrative—at times “just-so”5—is 
generally compelling, thought-provoking, and nearly irresistible.  In what follows I 
will suggest some of the limitations of the perspective, highlighting the conceptual 
shortcomings and unconvincing speculations that undermine the plausibility of 
Hoffman’s analysis as a tool for understanding or evaluating existing legal 
doctrine. 
Perhaps the most glaring omission from Hoffman’s project is the sort of 
careful conceptual analysis generally associated with the discipline of philosophy.  
Although he occasionally acknowledges the complexity of the moral concepts he is 
invoking, he seems disinclined to meaningfully engage the “philosophical 
ramblings” (P. 133.) that might lend precision and focus to his efforts.  Indeed, in 
what may amount to a telling error, he misidentifies John Darley, the eminent 
Princeton social psychologist, as a legal philosopher.  (P. 59.)  Apart from the 
scurrilous libel this would surely represent in certain quarters, it highlights a more 
fundamental problem with Hoffman’s undertaking.  Although our evolutionary 
origins may shed light on modern punishment practices, the picture is ultimately 
distorted without the conceptual clarity that would allow us to distinguish justified 
from unjustified punishment on the basis of morally relevant reasons. 
Some of the confusion stems from Hoffman’s reliance on a broad notion of 
forgiveness.  Although forgiveness, as a moral concept, is generally reserved for 
situations in which the forgiver has a change of heart toward a blameworthy 
wrongdoer,6 Hoffman conceptualizes as forgiveness any instance of, or basis for, 
withholding punishment.  Thus, declining to punish the insane or the self-defender 
counts as forgiveness, as does withholding punishment for minor harms.  At the 
same time, Hoffman maintains, forgiveness is possible even after punishment is 
inflicted or in cases where it is not inflicted but enough time has elapsed that the 
urge has passed. 
In fact, however, withholding punishment in the case of an insane offender 
has nothing to do with forgiveness as conventionally understood; it reflects a moral 
(and perhaps practical) judgment that the offender lacked sufficient capacity to be 
held accountable in the first place.  If he cannot be blamed, he cannot be forgiven.7  
Similarly, a person who defends himself against another’s aggression does not 
stand in need of forgiveness, for he, too, is without moral blame.  Talk of 
                                                                                                                                          
5   Id. at 35 (Acknowledging the “just-so” critique of evolutionary psychology as “[n]ot 
knowing how our ancestors really behaved, it is easy to assume in hindsight a behavior that just-so 
happens to make evolutionary sense.”). 
6   See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 14, 15 
(1988) (arguing that forgiveness entails a change of attitude toward the offender, which may or may 
not be associated with a corresponding change in treatment). 
7   Although Hoffman at one point endorses this idea, his broader analysis does not reflect that 
understanding.  See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 191 (“We cannot forgive what we don’t blame.”). 
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forgiveness in these cases is simply out of place.8  Finally, letting go of resentment 
and the attendant urge to punish due to the passage of time seems less like 
forgiving than forgetting, which sometimes just happens.  By the same token, 
forgiving—letting go of justified resentment—does not entail forgoing 
punishment. 
These distinctions matter.  The point is not that “forgiveness” has a single, 
authoritative meaning that Hoffman is bound to respect; it is that his indiscriminate 
usage makes it impossible to know (or evaluate) what we are actually talking 
about.  From a legal and philosophical perspective, “[f]orgiveness is the sort of 
thing that one does for a reason, and where there are reasons there is a distinction 
between good ones and bad ones.”9  As an experienced trial judge, Hoffman surely 
knows this, but he seems drawn to a conception of forgiveness that neglects these 
distinctions.  Bromides about the restorative power of forgiveness—“we never 
fully recover until we forgive” (P. 191.)  —are morally obtuse absent a careful 
assessment of the context and circumstances.  Forgiveness may come as an 
appropriate response to a wrongdoer’s remorse or repentance; or it may reflect a 
person’s lack of self-respect or indifference to the moral order.10  Sound moral and 
legal judgment depends on the difference. 
A similar confusion plagues Hoffman’s discussion of mercy and justice.  
Hoffman is critical of a fellow jurist, who reportedly denied a plea for mercy on 
the grounds that judges “are not in the mercy business; we are in the justice 
business.”  (P. 137.)  According to Hoffman, this judge has confused second and 
third-party punishment, improperly denying mercy a role in just sentencing.  That 
is, the judge, a third-party punisher, has taken on the role of a second-party 
punisher (i.e., a victim) by rejecting the possibility of mercy.  Elsewhere, Hoffman 
asserts that mercy is the distinct prerogative of third-party punishers: “Judges show 
mercy; victims simply forgive.”  (P. 190.) 
Hoffman’s analysis of justice and mercy (and forgiveness) betrays a 
fundamental misunderstanding of some well settled legal and philosophical 
distinctions.  Thus, traditional mercy is controversial in the criminal law precisely 
because it is taken to involve a set of emotions and judgments more naturally 
suited for private relationships (i.e., the second-party context).  To the extent that 
justice consists in giving offenders their due, mercy represents a departure from 
justice.11  Although this is largely unproblematic in the interpersonal setting—
                                                                                                                                          
8   See Murphy, supra note 6, at 15 (“Forgiveness, Bishop Butler teaches, is the forswearing of 
resentment—the resolute overcoming of the anger and hatred that are naturally directed toward a 
person who has done one an unjustified and non-excused moral injury.”). 
9   Id. 
10  Id. at 24 (“Acceptable grounds for forgiveness must be compatible with self-respect, 
respect for others as moral agents, and respect for the rules of morality or the moral order.”). 
11  Id. at 169.  To be sure, the role of mercy, and its relationship to justice in the criminal law 
context, remains unsettled.  See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Criminalization and the Criminal Process: 
Prudential Mercy as a Limit on Penal Sanctions, in THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 27 (R.A. 
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where family, friends, and acquaintances do not have an obligation to do justice—
it creates problems in the criminal law, which is predicated on that obligation.  
Moreover, because mercy requires a degree of discretion that defies systematic 
legal codification or application, it is generally thought to be in tension with the 
rule of law.  As a result, a sentencing decision to show mercy raises questions of 
equality, legitimacy, and justice.12 
All of this suggests that Hoffman’s judicial colleague who eschewed mercy in 
sentencing was clarifying rather than confusing the roles of justice and mercy as 
conventionally understood.  As before, Hoffman is not bound by these 
conventions, but he undermines his argument by failing to engage them.  One may 
take the position that mercy should play a greater role in sentencing, but a 
persuasive defense of that position would involve an acknowledgement of the 
relevant moral considerations. 
Hoffman’s discussion of excuses and justifications in the criminal law is also 
unsatisfying.  Hoffman notes that historically, doctrines of excuse, such as 
insanity, applied in cases of mental impairment that affected the wrongdoer’s brain 
function.  However, an excused wrongdoer generally would not escape 
punishment.  In contrast, doctrines of justification, such as self-defense, “deal with 
the problem of ordinary brains having their moral judgment acutely disabled by 
some extraordinary circumstances that would cause most of us to commit the same 
wrong.”  (P. 174.)  A successful justification defense would result in an acquittal 
and no punishment.  Hoffman contends that the distinction is less relevant in the 
modern era, however, because “[j]ustified and excused actors are generally treated 
the same” (P. 175.)  —a successful defense precludes punishment in either kind of 
case.  Moreover, he believes the distinction is meaningless in any event, for “our 
evolutionary take on responsibility resonates with one particular position: that 
excuse and justification are grounded on the idea that the wrongdoers’ brains, 
although healthy enough to form intentions and act on them, are simply not 
rational enough to be blamed.”  (P. 176.) 
This is a truly puzzling analysis.  As an initial matter, a justified act is, by 
definition, not wrongful.  In the case of self-defense, for example, when we say 
that the actor is justified in using deadly force (to fend off a deadly attack), we are 
saying in effect that he did the right (or at least permissible) thing under the 
circumstances.  Although killing another person is prima facie wrong, it is 
justified—not wrongful—for an innocent to fend off an aggressor.  The actor—the 
innocent—far from being “not rational enough,” acted not only rationally but 
morally.13 
                                                                                                                                          
Duff et al. eds., 2010).  The point is that calls for mercy in the legal and philosophical literature 
acknowledge, as Hoffman does not, the conceptual tension at the heart of the issue. 
12  Historically, official mercy is most associated with God and monarchs.  Its legitimacy is 
less obvious in a liberal democracy.  See Mary Sigler, Mercy, Clemency, and the Case of Karla Faye 
Tucker, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 455, 482 (2007). 
13  Similarly, an actor’s heightened rationality—choosing to act wrongfully to avoid some 
other harm—is what gives the duress defense (mentioned by Hoffman) what claim it has to being a 
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Insanity, by contrast, involves conduct that is not justifiable—killing a police 
officer whom the actor believes to be an invading space alien, for example.  Thus, 
excuse defenses like insanity reflect the judgment that the offender is blameless not 
because he did the right thing, but because he lacked the capacity to know or act on 
what is right.  We let the insane wrongdoer off the liability hook (when we do14) 
because his mental impairment renders him ineligible for blame and thus for 
punishment. 
What is the source and significance of these misconceptions?  I believe they 
are traceable to Hoffman’s broader conceptual framework, which is largely 
instrumentalist and consequentialist.  According to Hoffman, because the practice 
of punishment, in its various forms, flows from an evolutionary imperative to deter 
conduct that threatened individual, genetic, and group survival, the institution of 
punishment in the modern era must be similarly oriented around that imperative.  
On this view, deterrence is not only the key to responsibility, but the key to 
retribution and justice as well.  This leads Hoffman to neglect the nuances of 
meaning that lie behind ordinary usage.  Although he sometimes reveals that he is 
attuned to the distinctions, his insistence that retribution is the same thing as 
deterrence leads him into further confusion. 
This confusion produces some basic misapprehensions about our blaming 
practices and the nature of individual responsibility.  In particular, assimilating all 
instances of withholding punishment under the heading “forgiveness”—and 
ignoring the morally relevant differences between justified and excused conduct—
is inconsistent with the conception of human agency that animates our doctrines of 
responsibility.  The criminal law, in the modern liberal state, is predicated on the 
(rebuttable) presumption that individuals have the capacity for rationality—that 
our conduct generally reflects our choices.  In this way, punishment in proportion 
to our blameworthiness (a mix of culpability and harm) reflects a validation of our 
moral personhood, our capacity to choose.  To withhold punishment, absent a 
countervailing justification,15 is to deny our capacity not only for rational agency, 
but for the range of rights and responsibilities grounded in the liberal conception of 
the person.16 
                                                                                                                                          
form of justification.  Most modern courts and commentators treat duress as an excuse, however, 
because it involves situations in which the actor’s will is overborn by a wrongful threat.  This 
contrasts with necessity—typically a justification defense—which involves choosing the lesser of two 
evils in a forced-choice situation.  In these circumstances, choosing the lesser evil is morally justified.  
To be sure, the law—and courts—are not always consistent in their application of these doctrines, but 
the distinction itself reflects an important moral difference.  For a thorough discussion, see JOSHUA 
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 217–20 (6th ed. 2012). 
14  In the actual case where a teen killed a police officer based on such a delusion, the jury 
rejected the insanity defense.  See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006). 
15  Of course where the conduct is justified—in a case of self-defense, for example—
punishment is inapt not because the actor lacks rationality but because his conduct was not wrongful. 
16  See generally Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475 (1968) 
(arguing that respect for human agency requires holding individuals accountable for their 
misconduct). 
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To be sure, if Hoffman were only interested in tracing the evolutionary origins 
of punishment, his imprecise use of terms like forgiveness and excuse might not 
matter so much.  But Hoffman aims more ambitiously to draw normative insights 
from the evolutionary narrative to justify and potentially reform modern penal 
practices.  In that pursuit, he is of course free to challenge conventional 
understandings—to reject, for example, the liberal conception of the person.  
Instead, he mostly ignores them, and the resulting failure to engage this set of 
moral distinctions undermines the relevance of his analysis. 
There is also an irony in Hoffman’s neglect of moral philosophy.  The 
familiar knock on modern normative philosophy concerns the degree to which it is 
thought to rely on individual speculation about right and wrong.  According to 
Paul Robinson, for example, whom Hoffman frequently cites, modern moral 
philosophy is hobbled by a methodology that amounts to “winging it”—deriving 
moral principles from the philosophers’ own personal reflections.17  The results, on 
this view, are biased by the philosopher’s inclination to reject otherwise sound 
principles that fail to accord with his own intuitions.18 
In Hoffman’s analysis, a variety of speculations about the evolutionary roots 
of popular intuitions raises doubts about the validity of his enterprise.  The 
problem is not that speculation is illegitimate per se; it is rather that many of 
Hoffman’s evolutionary speculations simply fail to resonate.  Consider, for 
example, degrees of blameworthiness tested in the experimental setting.  Asked to 
rank a series of offenses, participants overwhelmingly agreed that brutally killing 
one’s grandmother for an inheritance (by burning her alive) is worse than shooting 
to death a co-worker as revenge for getting fired.  Hoffman, convinced of the 
validity of evolutionary explanations, concludes that the result “most likely” 
reflects “the kin/non-kin difference.”  (P. 70.)  Really?  It strikes me as much more 
likely that the result reflects our moral sense that murdering a vulnerable person—
granny was an invalid with an oxygen mask—and causing extreme suffering is 
more egregious than a garden variety gun murder.  Indeed, Hoffman goes on to 
note the possible secondary relevance of vulnerability—even to observe that 
“youth seems to trump kin when we are talking about injuring unrelated young 
victims versus related old ones.”  (P. 70.)  In these cases, it is unclear what work 
the evolutionary perspective is doing, except perhaps distracting Hoffman from the 
most plausible account of relative moral blameworthiness. 
                                                                                                                                          
17  Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between 
Deontological and Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1840 (2007). 
18  In the domain of philosophy, this limitation is offset by a complex process of testing a wide 
range of intuitions not only against one’s own principles, but also critically evaluating them in light 
of a broader set of theoretical commitments.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 40 (1971); 
Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics, 76 J. PHIL. 256, 258 
(1979).	
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In another context, Hoffman tries to generate an evolutionary account of 
attempt liability.19  He suggests that our instinct to punish attempts less (if at all) 
than completed offenses is based on the difficulty of determining a defendant’s 
intentions in the absence of conduct.  But Hoffman cites studies to show that 
people feel very strongly about attempts, even unsuccessful ones.  Thus, study 
participants rated an unsuccessful murder attempt (intent without harm) as more 
serious than an accidental killing (harm without intent).  After trying 
unsuccessfully to identify an evolutionary basis for this result, Hoffman suggests 
that it could be a “modern cultural artifact.”  (P. 313.)  Maybe, but isn’t that always 
a possibility?  I’m not sure Hoffman has provided any reliable mechanism for 
distinguishing such cases.20 
Indeed, Hoffman’s evolutionary focus in the context of attempts seems to lead 
him even further astray.  In the course of exploring the point at which conduct 
constitutes a criminal attempt, Hoffman speculates that at an early stage in the 
course of a would-be murder attempt, liability would be inappropriate “because of 
course at that point, without more, we have no idea whether” a murder is actually 
afoot.  (P. 309.)  Although Hoffman is surely correct about the epistemic 
challenges of determining intent based on otherwise innocent conduct, by focusing 
on the “detection” problem he overlooks an important moral point.  Attempt 
liability is complicated not only because of the practical challenges of trying to 
determine when someone mentally crosses the line; it also raises the possibility of 
a premature legal intervention.  That is, at least part of the challenge of enforcing 
attempt liability is the liberal state’s reluctance to ascribe conclusive intent to an 
actor who might yet desist from criminal conduct.  Because the state generally 
does not punish for thoughts (or innocent conduct), it cannot readily justify 
criminal liability—even if we could know an actor’s intentions—at an early stage 
in the process. 
The limitations of the evolutionary perspective in understanding attempt 
liability point to a more general limitation of Hoffman’s dissonance test.  Recall 
that the dissonance test is Hoffman’s framework for evaluating questionable legal 
doctrines by determining their compatibility with our evolved intuitions.  He is 
careful to note that sometimes our intuitions should give way, sometimes our 
doctrines; further, that we cannot always be sure that our intuitions are genuinely 
                                                                                                                                          
19  Hoffman focuses on failed attempts in which the intended victim is not physically harmed.  
HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 309. 
20  Another misfire is Hoffman’s implication that subjective awareness is a necessary element 
of harm.  Hoffman notes that that an unsuccessful murder attempt can still be harmful to a person, 
“assuming he became aware of the attempt on his life” and experienced emotional distress as a result.  
Id. at 309.  While it seems clear that someone could be psychologically harmed in this way, it does 
not follow that, absent the would-be victim’s (or witness’s) awareness, there would be no harm.  For 
example, it seems clear that if a person were drugged and raped, but suffered no physical injury and 
remained completely unaware of the incident, it would be inaccurate to say that he suffered no harm.  
Although the two kinds of cases are obviously distinguishable, the rape example shows that 
conscious awareness is not a condition of harm. 
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evolutionary in origin.  (P. 253)  As a result, he does “not pretend that this 
framework will revolutionize law.”  (P. 267.) 
I certainly hope not.  Although it’s tempting to imagine a mechanism that 
would allow us to sort good doctrine from bad,21 Hoffman’s own examples show 
the challenges of generating meaningful results.  Apart from the inconclusive 
attempt analysis already noted, Hoffman speculates about the evolutionary bases 
(or not) of conspiracy liability, the felony-murder rule, and corporate criminal 
liability.  In every case, Hoffman’s ruminations seem to reflect a degree of 
thoughtful policy analysis, but in no case does the dissonance test provide truly 
instructive insights from the evolutionary perspective.  Thus, despite Hoffman’s 
hope that “the evolutionary perspective [will] shift the debate from a mere clash of 
policies to a clash between policy and human nature,” (P. 308) the latter simply 
remains too speculative to establish a normative standard.  Instead, Hoffman’s 
insights—more psychological than evolutionary—at most highlight the challenges 
of convincing legal decision makers (like juries) to follow the law when it seems to 
be counterintuitive. 
In the end, for all of the scientific rigor that Hoffman attempts to marshal, he 
nevertheless falls prey to some familiar canards and clichés about our punishment 
practices.  In the course of discussing legal dissonances, for example, Hoffman 
notes that, despite what is popularly supposed, sentencing outcomes in the United 
States are generally harsher than individual citizens actually favor in an 
experimental setting.  Hoffman purports to identify an evolutionary explanation for 
this “troubling political phenomenon,” citing the “one-way punishment ratchet” 
that only moves upward.  (P. 258.)  On this view, the general public’s 
undifferentiated feelings of (vicarious) second-party blame prompt politicians to 
ratchet up third-party punishment.   
As an initial matter, the so-called “one-way ratchet” actually moves fairly 
readily in both directions.  As Hoffman’s own historical account shows, our 
modern modes of punishment are generally less harsh than they once were.  More 
generally, punishment practices are prone to cyclical changes in response to 
prevailing social and political conditions.  Presumably this is exactly what we 
would expect on the evolutionary analysis, vacillation between punishment and 
forgiveness (in Hoffman’s broad sense) as a community works to strike an optimal 
balance in the shadow of the Social Problem.  Too much punishment makes group 
life unstable; too little makes cooperation impossible.22  Indeed, the modern 
sentencing practices that prompted the upward ratchet metaphor are in the process 
of, well, ratcheting downward.  For a variety of policy reasons, recent trends in 
                                                                                                                                          
21  I found myself trying (unsuccessfully) to apply the framework to omission liability, a 
sometimes counterintuitive area of the criminal law.  At the same time, I was disappointed that 
Hoffman did not analyze the Model Penal Code approach to attempt liability, which treats attempts 
and successful crimes as equally blameworthy. 
22  HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 191 (“Too much forgiveness and not enough punishment would 
have unraveled our groups in anarchy; too much punishment and not enough forgiveness would have 
unraveled them in rebellion.”). 
276] OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 13:1 
276 
sentencing reflect a determination to cut back on the length and breadth of prison 
terms.23  Although Hoffman cannot be faulted for failing to anticipate exactly when 
the ratchet might move in the other direction, his own analysis should have made 
him more circumspect about blithely endorsing the “one-way” slogan. 
Finally, given the scientific orientation of Hoffman’s project, he seems 
improbably drawn to some standard platitudes about forgiveness.  Quoting 
Christian theologian Lewis Smedes, Hoffman intones, “when we forgive ‘we set a 
prisoner free and discover that the prisoner we set free was us.’”  (P. 196.)  In a 
similar vein, he quotes South African writer Alan Paton: “When a deep injury is 
done us, we never fully recover until we forgive.”  (P. 191.)  Although we can 
easily imagine the power of these insights in their original context, in Hoffman’s 
analysis they are hard to take seriously.  Holding on to resentment can be 
unhealthy, but it can also reflect a healthy sense of one’s own self-worth.  And 
letting go of resentment does not entail forgiving; sometimes it’s just a matter of 
moving on.  In any case, Hoffman’s take on forgiveness manages to offer the worst 
of both worlds—too broad to capture the variation and texture of our moral 
experience, too vacuous (at least out of context) to provide meaningful moral 
insight. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Despite these shortcomings, The Punisher’s Brain is both a worthwhile 
contribution to the literature on punishment and an engaging read.  My principal 
criticism is that it would have been more compelling if Judge Hoffman had 
approached the analysis of legal and moral concepts with the same precision and 
care reflected in his scientific analysis.  A book on punishment need not be a work 
of philosophy, but it should reflect a clear understanding of the moral concepts that 
structure and inform legal meaning and practice.  After all, conceptual clarity is not 
the exclusive purview of philosophers. 
To Hoffman’s credit, his dissonance framework does reflect the importance of 
distinguishing between a scientific explanation of a phenomenon and a normative 
prescription for our legal institutions and practices—between what is and what 
ought to be.  He is careful to point out that “moral questions…require answers that 
evolution alone cannot supply.”  (P. 260.)  Hoffman’s project also calls to mind the 
                                                                                                                                          
23  See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, In a Safer Age, U.S. Rethinks Its ‘Tough on Crime’ System, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2015, at A1 (describing bipartisan efforts to achieve cuts in federal sentencing); 
Editorial, Strong Steps on Sentencing Reform, N.Y. TIMES, July. 22, 2014, at A20 (“In 2013 alone, 35 
states passed at least 85 reform-minded bills that created community-based alternatives to prison, 
helped inmates re-enter society, and increased the use of data to help judge a person’s risk of re-
offending, according to the Vera Institute of Justice.”); E.J. Hurst, II, Federal Sentencing and Prison 
Reform now Bipartisan Issues, THE HILL (Aug. 13, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-
blog/crime/214998-federal-sentencing-and-prison-reform-now-bipartisan-issues (noting that younger 
Republicans “are working with Capitol Hill Democrats to shorten federal sentences, reduce 
populations in overcrowded prisons and even to count (and reconsider) the thousands of federal 
crimes on the books”). 
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idea that “ought implies can”—that the content of our moral obligations may be 
constrained by our natural capacities.24  On this view, there is value in 
understanding the kind of animal we are and its implications for what we can 
reasonably expect of one another.  Hoffman’s analysis of the evolutionary origins 
of punishment advances this important conversation. 
                                                                                                                                          
24  For a thoughtful discussion of the possible meanings (and misuses) of the expression, see 
Robert Stern, Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can?’, 16 UTILITAS 42 (2004). 
